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Abstract
In this study we examine every Small Corporate Offering Registration available from the United States.
Using 339 micro-IPOs from 33 states, we find support for the relevance of (1) offering marketing mechanisms and
expenses; (2) geographic characteristics; (3) offering characteristics; (4) ownership and governance characteristics;
(5) business characteristics; (6) firm marketing mechanisms; and (7) signaling factors.
*Correspondence should be sent to James C. Brau, Finance Department, Marriott School of Management, Brigham
Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA, jbrau@byu.edu, 801.318.7919.
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Introduction
In this article we expand Brau and Osteryoung’s (2001) work on micro-IPOs filed in the
U.S. state of Washington via the Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR). We broaden the
scope of that study to include the entire United States. Brau and Osteryoung (2001) analyzed a
sample of 73 SCOR documents. Through theory, they identified variables that should impact the
probability of success or failure in a SCOR offering and then empirically tested them. They
found empirical support for the relevance of (1) marketing mechanisms and expenses; (2)
ownership and governance factors; (3) business life cycle stages; and (4) signaling factors
consistent with their theoretical predictions.
Our goal here is not only to expand on the work of Brau and Osteryoung (2001), but to
verify if their findings can be generalized nationwide. In doing so, our sample consists of 339
SCORs from 33 U.S. states. In addition to scale, the scope of our study broadens that of Brau and
Osteryoung (2001) to include additional SCOR variables. We test the original Brau and
Osteryoung (2001) factors, along with our new variables against SCOR offering success. To
access the level of success of an IPO, traditional IPO literature relies on first day return (i.e.,
underpricing) and long-run market performance. Evidence of initial underpricing has been
documented in many studies, for example Logue (1973), Ibbotson (1975), and Ibbotson, Sindelar
and Ritter (1994). In another seminal paper, Ritter (1991) provides evidence of long-run
underperformance of IPOs. This result has been confirmed by other studies such as Loughran
and Ritter (1995), Spies and Affleck-Graves (1995), Lee (1997), and Loughran and Ritter
(2000). These two strands of research rely on aftermarket data that is not available for our
sample of micro-IPOs. Instead, we follow Brau and Osteryoung (2001), and define success as an
IPO that raises at least the minimum capital sough to break escrow.
We also report the results of a survey of owners of SCOR firms in line with the methods
of Brau and Fawcett (2006). We find that only 53.3 percent of the firm owners were pleased with
the SCOR offering process and report qualitative answers to how these firms marketed their
offering.
We find support for the relevance of (1) offering marketing mechanisms and expenses;
(2) geographic characteristics; (3) offering characteristics; (4) ownership and governance
characteristics; (5) business characteristics; (6) firm marketing mechanisms; and (7) signaling
factors.
In the remainder of the paper we discuss the Brau and Osteryoung (2001) study, our data
sources, empirical methods, univariate results, multivariate results, survey results, and then
conclude.
The Washington-only Study
Brau and Osteryoung (2001) was the first academic study to explore the subject of micro-
IPOs employing the SCOR database. (We believe we are the second.) Their data set consists of
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all the SCOR documents available in the state of Washington, which is the state where the SCOR
system was first implemented. They found empirical support for the relevance of (1) marketing
mechanisms and expenses; (2) ownership and governance factors; (3) business life cycle stages;
and (4) signaling factors consistent with their theoretical predictions.
Brau and Osteryoung (2001), consistent with their anecdotal evidence, report that issuers
who aim their securities to a specialist group and included some restrictions in their securities
have a greater probability of success. More specifically, 34 percent of the successful offerings
were aimed at a specialist group but only 5 percent of failed offerings did. Also, 46 percent of
the profitable mico-IPOs offered restricted securities, while only 17 percent of unsuccessful
offerings did.
Consistent with Frey (1998), Brau and Osteryoung (2001) provide evidence that
successful mico-IPOs stay away from concentrated ownership and that family businesses
experience a lower level of agency costs. Also, in line with the theoretical formulation of Maug
(2000), they report that the SCOR procedure is better suited for firms in the latest stages of the
business life. For example, Brau and Osteryoung (2001) report that 25.9 percent of businesses in
an early life cycle stage have successful IPOs compared with 60.5 percent that have unsuccessful
IPOs.
Regarding the signaling variables, Brau and Osteryoung (2001) follow the theory of
Leland and Pyle (1977). Consistent with the signaling literature they provide evidence that
successful mico-IPOs have a larger number of employees and a significantly higher average net
tangible book value.
Our study has a broader scope than that of Brau and Osteryoung (2001) not only in
sample size but in the number of issues we explore. Our sample consists of all SCORs
documented in 33 U.S. states. These 33 states represent the population of SCOR-accepting
states (the other 17 states did not permit the system or had no record of a SCOR offering.) As
such this is the first academic study that looks at the mico-IPOs topic from a nationwide
perspective. Several issues are addressed here that distances our analyses from that of Brau and
Osteryoung (2001). For example, an important issue pointed out in this study is the relation
between the location of the firm’s headquarters and the probability of successful IPO. Also, we
explore the issue that many of the offerings differ on their preferences between dividends or
interest.
Data
Data Sample
Our sample consists of 339 SCORs with original file dates from 1988 through 1998
obtained from 33 U.S. states. This sample represents the entire population of SCORs that these
states have on record and could locate.
Tables I-IV report the sample summary statistics and Pearson Correlations with success
or failure for each of the variables used in this study. We refer the reader to the Appendix for a
description of each of these variables (listed in alphabetical order). Tables I-IV are divided into
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eight panels corresponding with each of the six categories of theoretical factors discussed in the
2001 article and also including two additional categories: Geographic Characteristics of
Offering and Firm Marketing Mechanisms. Geographic Characteristics of Offering refers to the
state in which the firm’s headquarters is located. This is also the state from which we obtained
the SCOR registration. Firm Marketing Mechanisms refers to methods the firms employ to
market their products (not the securities offerings).
In each of the six original categories, we maintain many of the same variables examined
in Brau and Osteryoung (2001), but we have rejected any that were not found to be significantly
correlated with success or failure in our tests. Given the broader scope of the current analysis,
we also include several additional variables in these categories that were not examined in their
study. All of the variables, with the exception of Success, are taken directly from the SCOR
offering prospectuses. In order to maintain consistence with the Brau and Osteryoung (2001)
study, we determined whether a firm has a successful offering by referring to the registering
state’s records. For those issues in which the outcome of the offer is not included in the state
records, we obtained this information by calling the companies.
Summary Statistics
Table I, Panel A reports that six percent of SCOR filers pay a finders fee, the average
firm spends $13,711 ($10,000 median) in legal and accounting fees, 36 percent of offerings
include shares with restrictions placed on subsequent transfers, and 20 percent of offerings are
limited to members of a special group. Brau and Osteryoung (2001) report that based on the
Washington-only data, just 28 percent of offerings included transfer restrictions and only 16
percent were limited to a special group. Panel A also shows that 80 percent of firms held
offering proceeds in escrow until a minimum was obtained, and 49 percent paid interest earned
on proceeds during the escrow period to investors.
Panel B lists geographical locations (i.e., state) for a firm’s headquarters that affect
offering success. Of these states, Washington is by far the most popular location for firms
raising capital through the SCOR procedure (22 percent). At 12, 7, and 5 percent respectively,
South Carolina, Idaho, and Kansas are next in line.
Table II, Panel A lists the offering characteristic variables used in this study. Half of all
SCOR offerings include securities with certificates that bear a legend notifying holders of
transfer restrictions, the average minimum total proceeds sought is $288,597 (median $250,000),
and the average minimum proceeds net of fees sought is $246,711 (median $214,000). Although
the SCOR program theoretically allows a firm to obtain up to $1,000,000 per 12-month period,
most firms do not seek the entire amount. The average proceeds actually obtained is $300,031,
which would indicate most firms do achieve the minimum capital sought for escrow, but this
figure includes data from only 34 percent of the firms in the sample. Panel B of Table II reports
that only half of all firms in the sample successfully broke escrow and obtained at least the
minimum capital sought. Brau and Osteryoung (2001) report that the Washington-only success
rate was 37.5 percent.
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In Table III, we display the summary statistics for company-specific data. Panel A
reports that 97 percent of CEOs in our sample also serve as company directors and that officers
would beneficially own an average of 2,908 shares after the offering if the maximum shares were
sold and 3,546 if the minimum shares were sold; however these share numbers are highly
skewed by an outlier that has share numbers of 488,809 and 510,612 respectively. Panel A also
displays a mean 1,334 shares held by firm insiders if the minimum shares are sold, but this
number is also highly skewed by an outlier with 212,615 shares. Consistent with the
Washington-only findings in Brau and Osteryoung (2001), the average number of company
directors is four.
Panel B of Table III indicates that 13 percent of the SCOR offerings include securities
that have preference as to dividends or interest, 14 percent have preference upon liquidation,
eight percent are firms in the medical supply industry, 30 percent are firms with operations that
depend on patents, the mean number of common shares among firms in the sample is 711,272
(median 11,000) and the average additional paid-in capital is $780,000 (median $284,243).
These last two variables are also skewed by the outliers displayed in the column labeled
“maximum.”
Table IV, Panel A, reports the prevalence and impact of various mediums used for the
marketing of the firms’ products. Direct sales is by far the most popular method, being used by
nearly half of all firms in this study. The hire of marketing staff and paper ads are both half as
popular as direct sales, and radio ads and telemarketing are the least-used methods.
We conclude our presentation of summary statistics with the signaling variables listed in
Panel B of Table IV. The average net tangible book value is reported at -$54,778 (median
$28,695), negative and significantly lower than the $412,472 computed from the Washington-
only data in Brau and Osteryoung (2001). But as is the case with several variables mentioned
previously, this mean is significantly skewed by the outlying minimum shown. Average total
debt reported by companies in our sample is $317,437 (median $48,931), skewed by the outlying
maximum, 20 percent of firms reported liquidity problems or risk of default on debt, and 41
percent claimed not to be dependent on few suppliers for raw materials. Panel B also reports that
CEOs ($52,897 mean salary) tend to be paid slightly more than directors and CFOs ($42,571
mean salary).
Analysis
Pearson Correlation with Success or Failure
In this section we refer back to Tables I-IV to analyze the included Pearson Correlations
between our explanatory variables and the binary variable that equals one for a successful offer
and zero otherwise. These correlations directly test whether and how each variable influences
the probability of success.
Table I, Panel A reports that payment of a finders fee is negatively correlated with
success (p=0.02) while the amount of legal and accounting fees is positively correlated with
success (p=0.02). Brau and Osteryoung (2001) hypothesize that the amount of fees would be
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positively correlated with success as a higher fee suggests not only that a firm has the financial
stability to afford a higher fee but also that the service quality of the execution team is superior.
Our results are consistent with this logic.
Consistent with the Washington-only data in Brau and Osteryoung (2001), offerings to
specialist groups and offerings of shares with transfer restrictions are correlated with success
(both p=0.02). Τhe holding of offering proceeds in escrow until a minimum is obtained and the
payment of interest earned during the escrow period to investors are negatively correlated with
success. An explanation for this finding is that both of these variables convey weak management
confidence in obtaining the proceeds sought. Firms are pressured to return the interest on
proceeds in escrow if they anticipate a lengthy timeline for obtaining the capital being sought.
Although the state of Washington created the SCOR program and has more SCORs on
file than any other U.S. state, Panel B shows a negative correlation between success and
companies based in Washington (p=0.2). South Carolina, Michigan, and North Dakota also give
negative correlations, while Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Wyoming experience a better than
average success rate.
In Table II, Panel A we find that noting transfer restrictions on stock certificates is very
beneficial to offering success. We assume that firms committed to a higher level of transparency
are more likely to win investor confidence. Total and net minimum proceeds sought are both
negatively correlated with success, perhaps indicating that outside investors are concerned with
insiders who attempt to exit too quickly (Leland and Pyle (1977)).
Table III, Panel A reports that the CEO’s presence on the board of directors is negatively
correlated with success consistent with Lawler and Finegold (2005). The amount of shares
beneficially owned by company officers is also negatively correlated with success, while the
number of shares held by non-management insiders exhibits a positive correlation. Consistent
with theoretical predictions and the results of Brau and Osteryoung (2001), this finding indicates
that investors look favorably on insider ownership, but are somewhat skeptical of inside owners
who are also company officers. Relying on the work on agency theory by Jensen and Mekling
(1976) and Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000), it follows that outside investors may fear that insiders
who are officers will take perks that will benefit themselves (the agent in this case), but will cost
outside investors (the principal). The positive correlation between the number of directors and
success is also consistent with the Brau and Osteryoung (2001) findings.
None of the business characteristics reported in Table III, Panel B is found to be
conducive to offering success. Because the majority of individual investors in IPOs are located
in high tax brackets, it is plausible that they would be cool to securities with preference as to
dividends and interest payments, preferring instead a firm that plows its earnings back into
operations. At the same time, we are quite surprised that investors should consider liquidation
preference unattractive. The correlation computed for dependence on patents suggests that
investors prefer tangible to intangible assets, at least at the early stages of company development,
and we interpret the negative coefficients associated with additional paid in capital and common
shares outstanding as signifying investor concerns with respect to increased dilution of company
stock.
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Panel A of Table IV reports that of the various marketing mechanisms employed by the
firms in our sample, the two most popular methods (direct sales and the hire of a marketing staff)
were both negatively correlated with offering success. Telemarketing also exhibits negative
correlation. The mechanisms that appear preferred by investors are the impersonal paper and
radio advertisement approaches.
Panel B of Table IV displays the final set of significant correlations in our analysis.
Consistent with Brau and Osteryoung (2001), net tangible book value and total debt are
significantly and positively correlated with offering success (both p=0.02). The remainder of
our signaling variables, however, are found to be negatively correlated with success. Firms
exhibiting liquidity concerns, are logically less attractive to investors, but the coefficients
computed for CEO, CFO, and director remuneration contradict the results of Brau and
Osteryoung (2001).
Logit Test with Success as the Dependent Variable
In this section, we use a logistic regression to analyze factors related to offering success
or failure in a multivariate setting. We used a logit model because the dependent variable is
binary, equaling one when the offer is a success and zero when it is a failure. The model is
reported in Table V with Panels A through G corresponding to the seven categories of theoretical
factors discussed in the previous sections. Many of the variables listed in these categories are
also found in Tables I-IV, but we include some additional variables which we have not
previously discussed.
In Panel A, we test the offering marketing mechanisms and expense variables.
Consistent with Brau and Osteryoung (2001), the coefficient of the specialist group variable is
negative and significant beyond the five percent level. At the same time, the negative specialist
group coefficient contradicts Brau and Osteryoung (2001) and the correlation reported above.
Panel B reports that the only geographic variable that is significant to our model is Washington,
whose coefficient is positive and significant beyond the five percent level. Although this finding
contradicts the Pearson Correlation computed for Washington in previous section, this finding
shows the existence of an omitted variable bias in the univariate setting.
Panel C indicates that a firm’s intention to use offering proceeds to reimburse a key
stakeholder is negatively correlated with success. This result follows from the theory of Leland
and Pyle (1977) and is consistent with the empirics of Ang and Brau (2003) that deal with
secondary share sales in IPOs. There are two types of shares that can be offered in a mainline
IPO, primary shares and secondary shares. Proceeds from primary shares go to the firm’s coffers
and are to be used for corporate purposes such as positive net present value projects. Proceeds
from secondary shares, on the other hand, go to the selling insider, not the firm. Investors take
the sale of secondary shares as a negative signal and action. Thus, the finding that reimbursement
of a key stakeholder is negatively correlated with success is consistent with the secondary share
literature.
The coefficient for issuance of common stock is also negative (ChiSq=0.0536), but
common stock is issued in 80 percent of SCOR offerings. In SCOR offerings, where much of
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the marketing is done through private networks, preferred stock deals typically indicate pre-sold
offers. For example, in conversations with entrepreneurs who issued SCOR offerings, it was
typical for doctor groups and golf courses to issue preferred stock to investors who had been
previously lined-up before the SCOR was filed (member physicians and golf club members in
these examples). In these cases, a successful issue is virtually guaranteed. The coefficients for
total maximum and minimum proceeds sought in the offering have signs consistent with
theoretical predictions and are statistically significant beyond the five percent level.
In Panel D, the family variable has a significant and positive coefficient, confirming our
predictions and the findings of Brau and Osteryoung (2001) regarding the familial relations of
insiders. Number of directors has now taken a significant negative coefficient, however,
contradicting previous tests and the Pearson Correlation computed above. Thus, when we
control for competing factors, we remove an apparent missing variables bias again. The business
lifecycle stage variables in Panel E have the signs predicted in Brau and Osteryoung (2001), and
Stage 2 demonstrates a very high level of significance. The negative coefficient (ChiSq=0.0221)
associated with firms in the technology industry may reflect investors’ reluctance to finance
speculative high-growth ventures in early stages of development. These types of firms typically
seek private equity through angels or venture capitalists. Selling products subject to regulation
and employing company officers who have worked for another company in the same business
show positive correlation to success while location (i.e., state headquarters) does not. The
coefficient computed for dividend preference is positive and significant beyond the five percent
level contradicting the correlation coefficient computed earlier. Again, we favor the coefficient
of this multivariate test over the Pearson Correlation.
Of the marketing mechanism variables listed in Panel F, only Telemarketing was
discussed previously. We find each of these variables to be positively correlated with offering
success beyond the five percent level. Consistent with our hypothesis in the last section, the
mechanisms most appealing to potential investors in an offering tend to be impersonal (with the
exception of telemarketing) and technology assisted. The coefficients for each of the variables
reported in Panel G carry the predicted signs and are statistically significant beyond the five or
ten percent level with the exception of Bankruptcy issues which is surprisingly positively
correlated with offering success.
Survey Analysis
Along with the data reported by each state’s security division, we also conducted a mail
survey to gain qualitative data on the SCOR process. We base our survey design on Dillman’s
(1978) Total Design Method, which is a standard for conducting academic surveys. Our overall
response rate of nearly 11 percent (37/339) compares favorably to the Graham and Harvey (2001)
response rate of approximately 9 percent, which they argue is comparable with other financial
survey studies.
Of the responding firms, 41.7 percent reported they successfully broke escrow, so the
majority of the firms that responded are classified as failed offerings by our definition of success.
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Of the responding firms, only 53.3 percent reported that they were pleased with the SCOR
system. As might be expected, all but one of the firms that broke escrow (i.e., success) reported
that they were pleased with the SCOR process. For those firms that did not break escrow (i.e.,
failure), only three were pleased with the process.
We asked an open-ended question on how the firm marketed the SCOR offering.
Table VI reports the raw replies from those firms that responded. Panel A is for unsuccessful
offers and Panel B is for successful offers. The top three marketing methods were newspaper
ads, email or internet ads, and word of mouth. Specifically, eight took out ads in the local
newspaper (two success, six failure); five listed email or internet advertising (two success, three
failure); and four listed word of mouth (three success, one failure). The remainder of the table is
left to the inspection of the reader.
Conclusions
In this report, we extend the work of Brau and Osteryoung (2001) beyond the state of
Washington to include the entire United States. We identify through theory, variables that may
impact the probability of success or failure in a SCOR offering and then empirically test them.
Through this analysis, we find support for the relevance of (1) offering marketing mechanisms
and expenses; (2) geographic characteristics; (3) offering characteristics; (4) ownership and
governance characteristics; (5) business characteristics; (6) firm marketing mechanisms; and (7)
signaling factors.
Comparing the results of the current study of SCORs throughout the United States with
the research published using data from Washington State alone; we find that many of the initial
predictions in Brau and Osteryoung (2001) are robust and that most of the results based on the
Washington-only data may be generalized.
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Table V
Logit Test with Success of Offer as Dependent Variable
Variable Estimate ChiSq
Panel: A Offering Marketing Mechanisms & Expenses
Selling agent -16.688 0.0051
Specialist group -6.985 0.0216
Panel B: Geographic Characteristics of Offering
Washington 11.776 0.0072
Panel C: Offering Characteristics
Reimbursement -16.509 0.0067
Common stock issue -17.320 0.0536
Total proceeds (max) 0.000 0.0262
Total proceeds (min) 0.000 0.0069
Panel D: Ownership and Governance Characteristics
Family 9.161 0.0128
Number of directors -0.892 0.0237
Panel E: Business Characteristics
Stage 2 13.270 0.0056
Stage 5 -3.521 0.1097
Technology -8.537 0.0221
Regulation 8.353 0.0160
Officer experience 6.626 0.0348
Location -26.242 0.0100
Dividend preference 29.063 0.0156
Panel F: Firm Marketing Mechanisms
Mailed ads 7.780 0.0318
Contracts 13.045 0.0099
Internet 4.696 0.0298
Telemarketing 9.749 0.0238
Panel G: Signaling Variables
CEO bachelors 8.608 0.0174
CEO masters 42.689 0.0956
Number of employees 0.528 0.0136
Net tangible book value 0.000 0.0544
Total debt 0.000 0.0268
Bankruptcy issues 27.029 0.0063
Total remuneration 0.000 0.0062
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Micro-IPOs:An Analysis of the Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR)
Procedure with National Data
APPENDIX
Variable Reference
APIC (min) Additional paid in capital if minimum shares sold
Bankruptcy issues
Yes if company officers were involved in bankruptcy proceedings
(past 5 years)
CEO bachelors Yes if CEO's highest degree is a bachelors
CEO director Yes if CEO is a company director
CEO masters Yes if CEO's highest degree is a masters
CEO remuneration CEO's remuneration for next year
CFO remuneration CFO's remuneration for next year
Common shares Common shares outstanding
Common stock issue Yes if securities are being offered as common stock
Contracts Yes if marketing strategy includes contracts
Direct sales Yes if marketing strategy includes direct sales
Director remuneration Directors' remuneration for next year
Dividend preference Yes if securities have preference as to dividends or interest
Escrow Yes if there is an escrow of proceeds until minimum is obtained
Family Yes if any insiders are related by blood or marriage
Finders fee Yes if there is a finder's fee
Idaho Yes if the registering state is Idaho
Insider shares (min)
Non-management insider shares held after offer if minimum
shares sold (%)
Interest in escrow Yes if interest on proceeds during escrow will be paid to investors
Internet Yes if marketing strategy includes internet
Kansas Yes if the registering state is Washington
Liquidation preference Yes if securities have preference upon liquidation.
Liquidity issues Yes if company has liquidity problems or risk of default
Location State of firm headquarters
Mailed ads Yes if marketing strategy includes mailed advertisements
Marketing staff Yes if marketing strategy includes hiring marketing staff
Medical supply industry Yes if firm's industry is medical supply
Michigan Yes if the registering state is Michigan
Montana Yes if the registering state is Montana
Net proceeds (min) Net proceeds from offering if minimum shares sold
Net tangible book value Total assets exclusive of intangibles minus total liabilities
North Dakota Yes if the registering state is North Dakota
Number of directors Number of directors of the company
Number of employees Number of employees at the time the SCOR was filed
Legal and accounting
fees Legal and accounting expenses if minimum shares sold
Officer experience
Yes if officers have worked for another company in the same
business
Officer shares (max)
Shares beneficially owned by officers after offering if maximum
shares sold (%)
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Officer shares (min)
Shares beneficially owned by officers after offering if minimum
shares sold (%)
Paper ads Yes if marketing strategy includes paper ads
Patents Yes if firm's operations depend on patents
Radio ads Yes if marketing strategy includes radio ads
Regulation Yes if company's property or products are subject to regulation
Reimbursement Yes if proceeds will reimburse a key stakeholder
Restricted Yes if transfer of the shares is restricted
Restrictions noted Yes if certificates bear a legend notifying holders of restrictions
Securities sold Actual amount of securities sold
Selling agent Yes if a commissioned selling agent is employed to sell shares
South Carolina Yes if the registering state is South Carolina
Specialist group Yes if offering is limited to members of a special group
Stage 2 Company is in the development stage
Stage 5 Company is in the "other" stage of development
Success The firm broke escrow and obtained at least the minimum capital
sought
Supplier independency
Yes if company does not depend on few suppliers for raw
materials
Technology Yes if firm's industry is technology
Telemarketing Yes if marketing strategy includes telemarketing
Total debt Total debt at time of offering
Total proceeds (max) Total proceeds if maximum shares sold
Total proceeds (min) Total proceeds if minimum shares sold
Total proceeds (min) Total proceeds if minimum shares sold
Total remuneration Dollar sum of all insider compensation in the last fiscal year
Washington Yes if the registering state is Washington
Wyoming Yes if the registering state is Wyoming
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